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THE INDEPENDENT BOARD OF
DIRECTORS AND
GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: WHERE IS THIS
HEADING?
FLORENCE SHU-ACQUAYE*

A downturn in the American economy has been greatly attributed
to events resulting from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.1
Although justifiable to a large extent, investors and others affected by
the recent downfall of some major companies cannot rely on the same
excuse. Two such companies, Enron and WorldCom, filed for the
largest bankruptcies in United States history in December 2001 and
July 2002, respectively. 2 Even more disturbing and scandalous, the
collapse of both companies stemmed directly from corporate
mismanagement. 3 Consequently, the finger undoubtedly points at the
* Florence Shu-Acquaye is Professor of Law at Nova Southeastern University,
Shepard Broad Law Center. She teaches Business Entities, Contracts, UCC: Sales,
Negotiable Instruments and Comparative Corporate Governance. I would like to thank
Ms. Heather Last for her excellent research assistance.
1. Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy: The Convergence of
Markets, Insurance,and Government Action, 37 Ariz. St. L.J. 435, 437-38 (2005).
2. Andrew Skouvakis, Student Author, Exiting the Public Markets: A Difficult
Choice for Small Public Companies Struggling with Sarbanes-Oxley, 109 Penn St. L.
Rev. 1279, 1281 (2005).
3. See Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Special Report-Corporate
Boards: The Way We Govern Now-CorporateBoards,The Economist 59, 59 (Jan. 11,
2003). Corporate mismanagement is an issue that became a paramount concern not
only in the United States, but also in other countries. Many countries are reviewing the
way companies are managed; in Germany, a committee under Gerhard Cromme
produced the country's first corporate-governance code in 2002; in Canada, the
Council of Chief Executives (a body of 150 persons holding positions in upper levels
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inadequacy of the corporate governance rules, with certain questions4
still to be answered about the oversight role of corporate directors.
The undisputed questions are whether the boards of directors failed to
exercise oversight function over management and, if so, why? In other
words, has board independence been compromised to the extent that a
board's decisionmaking undermines the interest of the shareholder and
stakeholders in violation of the directors' statutory fiduciary duty of
care? 5 Why is the board so reluctant to confront and expose

of management proposed new guidelines for listed companies). France "launched a
review of best corporate-governance practices." In Britain, a report on the role of
nonexecutive directors was prepared. Id.
In May 2003, the European Commission, in response to recent corporate
governance crises depicted by Enron and its progeny and the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the United States, presented an "Action Plan for
'Moderni[z]ing Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the
E[uropean] U[nion] .... ' " George L. Bustin et al., 2003 Annual Review of European
Union Legal Developments, 38 Intl. Law. 639, 647 (2004).
4. Jeffery N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and The New
Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1125, 1126-27 (2003). The
Enron case was especially troubling because "it represent[ed] a failed stress test for
many of institutions of U.S. shareholder capitalism .... " Many separate systems also
failed at the same time-"auditing and accounting, executive compensation, internal
monitoring by the board, and external monitoring by securities analysts." Id. at 1127.
5. This fiduciary duty of care is satisfied where the board makes an informed
decision, in good faith and in honest belief that the action was taken in the best interest
of the corporation. If the board satisfies this duty, it is protected by the business
judgment rule and its decision cannot be challenged. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
812 (Del. 1984). Hence, the business judgment rule serves as a shield that protects
directors from liability for their decisions; once it is found that a director should receive
this protection, the courts would not interfere with or second-guess her decision. See id.
Although this rule has been criticized by academics, the rule is not without a rational
basis. Compare William L. Cary & Sam Harris, Standard of Conduct Under Common
Law, PresentDay Statutes and the Model Act, 27 Bus. Law. 61 (1972) with Charles R.
T. O'Kelley & Robert B. Thompson, Corporationsand Other Business Associations:
Cases andMaterials259-61 (3d ed., Aspen L. & Bus. 1999).
In Joy v. North, Judge Winter illustrates this rational basis by showing that,
first, investors voluntarily undertake the risk of bad business judgment, as they have a
choice of not buying stocks from a company less prone to mistakes in judgment. 692
F.2d 880 (1982). Failing to do so means they recognize certain voluntariness in
undertaking the risk of bad business decision. Id. at 885.
"Second, courts recognize that after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect
device to evaluate corporate business decisions." That the "entrepreneur's function is
to encounter risks and to confront uncertainty, and a reasoned decision at the time
made may seem a wild hunch viewed [ ] later against a background of perfect
knowledge." Id. at 886.
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management and vice versa? The famous case of Smith v. Van Gorkom
still begs the question of whether the board of directors is anything
more than a rubber stamp of decisions made by corporate
management. 6 What is the effect of the inside versus outside director
dichotomy with regards to the board's independence? In this light,
much has been said about loosening the outside directors' ties to
management and recreating a vital and independent board [that] will
engage in active oversight, [rather than] passive agreement. 7 Is this
plausible, given that the same board members in one company may be
outside directors or officers for other companies? If the tacit consent of
"scratch my back and I'll scratch yours" inevitably prevails and leaves
room for corrupt practices, as evident by the recent downfall of some
blue chip companies, how do we achieve a truly independent board?
Should the board be composed exclusively of outside directors? 8 Are
Third, higher profits often corresponds to high risks, thus it is in the interest of the
shareholders that the law not create incentives for overly cautious corporate decisions,
especially given that shareholders can choose to diversify their portfolio holding to the
level of their risk tolerance. Id.
6. See generally Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (1985). For more a detailed
discussion of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the fiduciary duty, see generally Florence ShuAcquaye, Smith v. Van Gorkom Revisited: Lessons Learned in Light of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, 3 DePaul Bus. & Com. L.J. 19 (2004).
7. Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation-A Board-Based Solution, 34
B.C. L. Rev. 937, 942 (1993).
8. Even if one assumes that the independent board or outside directors is the
solution, who will monitor the monitorors? This is a problem often left out of the
monitoring equation but aptly expressed by Dr. Seuss over 30 years ago in a rhyme
entitled, "Did I Ever Tell You How Lucky You Are?"
Oh, the jobs people work at!
Out west, near Hawtch-Hawtch,
there's a Hawtch-Hawtcher-Bee-Watcher.
His job is to watch...
is to keep both his eyes on the lazy town bee.
A bee that is watched will work harder, you see.
Well.. .he watched and he watched.
But, in spite of his watch,
that Bee didn't work any harder. Not Mawtch.
So then somebody said,
"Our old bee-watching man
just isn't bee-watching as hard as he can.
He ought to be watched by another Hawtch-Hawtcher!
The thing that we need
is a Bee-Watcher-Watcher!"
WELL...
The Bee-Watcher-Watcher watched the Bee-Watcher.
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the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX or the Act) and the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) proposed rules helpful in addressing these
issues?
Although there is much debate on the inadequacy of accounting
rules and their enforcement, this article approaches the problem from
the perspective of the role of the board of directors as an oversight
body of the corporation. Hence, this article aims to address these
questions by:
* Looking at corporate boards of directors, their authority
and responsibilities, and their interaction with senior
executive officers.
* Discussing the inside and outside director dichotomy in
light of directors' independence. Looking at the Act, as
well as the NYSE, and their potential impact upon the
board of directors. (For example, does the Act enable the
board of directors to be more independent?)
* Incorporating in my discussion a survey of the top 100
boards of public companies in the United States to see
how the boards have evolved, if at all, since the new
regulations.
* Considering what are the strengths and weaknesses of an
independent board?
* Recommending what should be done to make the board
an independent decision-making body of the corporation.
* Discussing possible shortcomings and conclusion.
I. THE CORPORATE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND ITS AUTHORITY

The boards of directors are made up of individuals selected by
shareholders of a company, 9 and are the ultimate decision-making body
He didn't watch well. So another Hawtch-Hawtcher

had to come in as a Watch-Watcher-Watcher!
And today all the Hawtchers who live in the Hawtch-Hawtch
are watching on Watch-Watcher-Watchering-Watch,
Watch-Watching the Watcher who's watching that bee.

You're not a Hawtch-Watcher. You're lucky, you see!
Dr. Seuss, Did I Ever Tell You How Lucky You Are? 26-28 (1973); see also Ronald J.
Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for
InstitutionalInvestors, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863, 875 (1991).
9. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Discussion Paper No. 398, Asymmetric Information
and the Choice of Corporate Governance Arrangements (John M. Olin Ctr. for L.,
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of a company.' 0 The board selects the senior management team, acts
as the advisor and counselor to the senior management, and ultimately
monitors the management's performance. 11 Hence, the directors and
management have a contract with the corporation.
In fact, the
corporation is often described as an organization consisting of a nexus
of contracts: Such contracts include those between the employees,
suppliers, contractors, shareholders, directors, and the corporation. The
latter is the most important contract relating to the directors duties and
obligations to the corporation. 12 A director's powers to act on behest
of the corporation are derived from the state of incorporation. This
regulation by the laws of the state of incorporation is often referred to

Econ.,
and Bus.,
Harvard Law
School, Dec.
2002) (available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olincenter/papers/pdf/398.pdf (accessed Mar.
18, 2006)). The state laws and Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws determine the
manner by which the directors are elected to the board. O'Kelley & Thompson, supra
n. 5, at 192. A company may have a unitary board or staggered board of directors. Id.
In a unitary board system all directors stand for election each year, whereas with a
staggered board the directors are grouped into classes, (typically three classes, for
example Model Business CorporationsAct (MBCA) § 8.06 allows classification "into
two or three groups of as equal size as possible"), with one class of directors standing
for election each year. Id. Theoretically, staggered terms ensure that a corporation will
always have experienced directors in office; practically, two annual meetings would be
required to replace a majority of the board of directors. Id. This invariably means that
even a majority shareholder cannot easily change corporate policy by simply electing
an entirely new board. Id.
10. O'Kelley & Thompson, supra n. 5, at 155. The directors' management power is
exercised collectively and individual directors are not given agency powers to deal with
outsiders. Id.
11. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.01 (ABA 1984). The MBCA, which has been adopted
by over thirty states (with some variation in some states) provides in § 8.01 that "[a]ll
corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of' the board of directors
of the corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by
or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of the board of directors. Id. The
Delaware Code imports the same principle as the MBCA. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §
141(a) (2001). The language of the MBCA emphasizes the board's responsibility to
oversee management of the corporation. See infra nn. 20-26 and accompanying text
(discussing board responsibilities).
12. See Robert B. Thompson, The Law's Limits on Contracts in a Corporation, 15
J. Corp. L. 377, 378-80 (1990). That is why "it is not surprising that fiduciary duties
are used for the shareholder-manager relationship but not for other relationships, such
as the creditor-manager relationship." A shareholder's residual return depends on the
"discretionary performance of another," and should require "different protection than
the creditor's fixed return with a senior claim to the assets of the enterprise." Id. at 390.
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as the internal affairs doctrine. 13 Consequently, state law, amongst
other things, defines the director's powers over the corporation. 14 In
this vein, corporations are said to be creatures of state law, and it is
state law that is the font of corporate directors' powers. 15 Whether
state regulation results in efficient corporate law rules has been a
scholarly debate. Some scholars espouse the view that, because the
grant of corporate charters result in state tax revenue, 16 states tend to
adopt statutes that are management friendly, at the expense of
shareholders. 17 A term often associated with companies incorporated
in Delaware, these companies are said to be involved in "a race to the
bottom." 18 Regardless of whether companies are racing to "the top" or
to "the bottom," their state of incorporation determines how the board
of directors, as the managing head of the company, is to exercise
authority as a whole. However, the board's exercise of authority may
be subject to limitations created by the company's shareholders in the
Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws. 19

13. O'Kelley & Thompson, supra n. 5, at 163. The internal affairs doctrine is also
known as a choice of law rule since courts look to the laws of the incorporating state to
determine the basic rights and duties applicable to a [ ] corporation. Id.
14. Id. For example, state law determines the vote required to elect directors,
powers of the shareholders to remove directors prior to the end of their term in office,
etc.
15. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE's DirectorIndependence
Listing Standards, 30 Sec. Reg. L.J. 370, 371-72 (2002) (discussing the NYSE's
listings standards as it relates to director independence); see also Burks v. Lasker, 441
U.S. 471, 478, 486 (1979) (stating that the powers of corporate directors in determined
by state law).
16. O'Kelley & Thompson, supra n. 5, at 140. The state of Delaware, the home of
so many publicly-traded corporations, derives about 30% of its state budget from
corporate charters. Id.
17. Id. at 140-41. This is the case because corporate managers decide on the
particular state of incorporation. As incorporators, the owners of a firm may shop
around and choose to incorporate in whichever state offers the most attractive rules.
18. See Daniel R. Fischel, The " 'Race to the Bottom' " Revisited: Reflections on
Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 913, 915
(1982); Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in CorporateLaw, 8 Cardozo
L. Rev. 709, 709, 722 (1987); Florence Shu-Acquaye, The Taxonomy of the Director's
FiduciaryDuty of Care: United States and Cameroon, 22 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Intl. & Comp.
L. 585, 587 n. 5 (2003); but see William J. Carney, The Political Economy of
Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. Leg. Stud. 303, 317 (1997) (rejecting the
race to the bottom hypothesis).
19. The Articles of Incorporation set forth the terms of a corporation's existence,
usually filed with a state agency/office (usually the Secretary of State) when the
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A. GENERAL BOARD RESPONSIBILITIES
"Both by legal requirement and by the necessity of seeing that a
company is well managed for successful growth and continuity, a
number of basic responsibilities appear to be common to all boards of
directors," including trusteeship, determination of enterprise objectives,
selection of executives, securing long term business strategy and
growth, approval of major company decisions, checking on results, and
disposition of company profits and assets. 20 Looking at a more
contemporary description of some board responsibilities is more
appropriate, especially taking into account factors incorporated in the
recent laws and regulations. Hence, according to the Corporate
Director's Guidebook, the language of the Model Business
Corporations Act (MBCA) emphasizes the board's overall
responsibility to oversee management of the corporation, including
certain tasks performed by the board and its committees. 2 One scholar
corporation is created. Hence, these articles are public records that can be accessed by
anyone, whereas the Bylaws are internal administrative rules that are established after
the corporation has been created, and therefore not public documents per se.
20. Harold Koontz, The Board of Directors and Effective Management 24
(McGraw-Hill 1967). To competently discharge its responsibilities, the board
members must first understand the task of managing the company and their role in it.
Therefore, having the following minimum knowledge is quintessential: (1)
"Comprehend what management is if they expect to be responsible for the managing of
a company." (2) Understand the "fundamental principles of management if they are to
have some guidelines as to what effective management in their various companies
implies." (3) "Clearly appreciate their managerial role as well as the role of the top
officers to whom they will necessarily entrust most of the actual operating management
of the company." Id. at 10-11 (emphasis omitted).
21. ABA Comm. on Corp. Laws, CorporateDirector's Guidebook 4 (3d ed., ABA
2001). Board and committee tasks include:
* reviewing and monitoring performance of the corporation's business and its
operating financial and other corporate plans, strategies, and objectives, and
changing plans and objectives as appropriate;
* adopting policies of ethical conduct and monitoring compliance with those
policies and with applicable laws and regulations;
* understanding the corporation's financial statements and monitoring the
adequacy of its financial and other internal controls as well as its disclosure
controls and procedures;
* choosing, setting goals for, regularly evaluating and establishing the
compensation of the CEO and the most senior executives, and making
changes in senior management when appropriate;
* developing, approving, and implementing succession plans for the CEO and the
most senior executives;
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describes this monitoring function as the bifurcated function which is at
the heart of the agency cost model of the firm, 2 2 because it identifies
the central role for the board, necessary in light of managers'
temptation to shirk or to act opportunistically. 23 These two monitoring
functions consist of the board's ability to select, compensate, and make
implicit or explicit decisions about the retention of the chief executive
officer (CEO) and, on occasion, other members of senior management;
and overseeing the process of accounting, financial reporting, auditing,
and disclosure.
Accordingly, the absence of such an effective
*reviewing the process for providing adequate and timely financial and
operational information to the corporation's decision makers (including
directors) and shareholders;
* evaluating the procedures, operation and overall effectiveness of the board and
its committee;
* establishing the composition of the board and its committees, including
choosing director nominees who will bring appropriate expertise and
perspectives to the board, recognizing the important role of independent
directors.
22. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976). The
shareholder-manager relationship may be thought of as an agency relationship. An
agency relationship is defined through an explicit or implicit contract in which one or
more persons (the principal) hires another person or persons (the agent) to act on behalf
of the principal. The shareholders are the principals of the corporation who delegate
their powers to the board, their agents. As principals, they may exercise control over
their agents to ensure the interests of the agents conform to or do not deviate too far
from theirs. Id. at 308-09.
However, this control mechanism comes with a cost called "agency cost,"
which is a cost inherent in the principal-agent relationship. Jensen & Meckling hold
that there is a zero agency cost where ownership and management of a business vest in
the same person. Why? Because if you unite ownership with residual claim, he who
controls the residual assets will maximize the firms' profit without incurring agency
cost. See id. at 308-11; see also Florence B. Shu Acquaye, A Theory of Corporate
Governance and Its Application to Public Corporations in Cameroon, 36 Juridis
Periodique, 78 (1998).
23. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Laws,
Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89
Geo. L.J. 797, 801-02 (2001). Here the author discusses the three well-recognized
board functions, referred to in the standard typology as: 1) Monitoring; 2) Sociology of
organizational behavior-"to assist the company in claiming and protecting its shares
of external resources"-that is, the board members make the company more legitimate
in the eyes of major resource providers, such as governments, customers and more; and
3) Service-the boards partake in formulating corporate policies by acting as sounding
boards for the CEO and senior management and provide external input into the
strategic process. Id. at 801-03.
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monitoring board would, therefore, expectedly result in investors'
to invest in companies with dispersed share
increased unwillingness
24
ownership.
However, it has been propounded that there is a natural
inconsistency between the board's monitoring and managing function.
"As a board participates actively in corporate decision-making," it is
said to "sacrifice [ ] the capacity to monitor those decisions
independently." 25 For example, "[a] board that has negotiated the
structure of a merger is [unlikely] to evaluate the transaction neutrally."
Or a "board that works closely to advise the CEO and other top
executives sacrifices the distance necessary to assess executive
performance critically. ' 2 6 On the other hand, a board that maintains
greater distance runs the risk of inadequately understanding the
company it is attempting to monitor.
27

B. THE BOARD AND SENIOR EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

State corporation laws generally consider that a corporation will
have various officers responsible for the day-to-day management of the
corporation's business affairs. However, most states' laws are silent as
28
to exactly what the duties of these officers entail. The SOX (a federal

24. Id. at 802. That may be why some courts and regulators find the more potent
way of inducing better monitoring by directors is by " 'tweaking' the liability regime,
threatening some heavier sanction when the directors' monitoring conduct falls short of
the imagined ideal." Accordingly, a director who might be inclined to be a "less than
diligent monitor [ ] should shift to a more diligent posture or get off the board if the
Id. at 817likelihood of detection and expected liability consequences are high ....
18.
25. See Jill E. Fisch, Corporate Governance: Taking Boards Seriously, 19 Cardozo
L. Rev. 265, 280 (1997) (citing Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly
City of Potemkin Village? 95 Harv. L. Rev. 597, 611 (1982) (identifying psychological
and social constraints on outside directors' ability to act independently)).
26. Id. at 280-8 1.
27. "The term 'officer' connotes a corporate employee who ranks above other
corporate employees in a corporation's management hierarchy." The older corporate
statutes required that a corporation have a president, secretary and treasurer. Modem
corporate laws simply allow corporations to have the officers specified in the bylaws or
as determined by the board. MBCA § 8.40 (ABA 2005); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 142
(2005); see O'Kelley & Thompson, supra n. 5, at 156. The corporation's principal
officer is often termed the chief executive office (CEO), and often also serves as the
chair of the board of directors. Id.
28. See O'Kelley & Thompson, supra n. 5, at 156.
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29
as opposed to state law) more specifically defines these duties today.
For example, the Act requires that the CEO and the chief financial
officer (CFO of a corporation certify the financial reports of the
corporation.
As stated above, one of the board's responsibilities is to oversee
management of the corporation, by acting as an effective counselor to
management "without assuming management functions. ' 3 1 Proper
accountability by management to the board and the board ultimately to
the shareholders is quintessential. Hence, the corporate accountability
process begins with the board's critical role of selecting a CEO who
meets certain profile characteristics that are predictive of producing
32
significant increase in shareholder value.
This monitoring function of the board has been under strict
scrutiny-even more so after Enron and its progeny scandals.
Incorporation laws generally require that the board of directors elect
company officers; however, many directors "regard their primary
function as one of selecting the [CEO] or president of the
corporation
33
and approving the [CEO's] nomination of other officers."

Hence, the board's monitoring duties include hiring and firing top
executives-a function very rarely exercised.3 4 It has been widely
29. The issue often raised with regards to this distinction is whether the federal
government is attempting to regulate corporate law, a domain that has been
traditionally reserved to the state legislatures.
30. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745, 777
(2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 of the
Unites States Code) [hereinafter SOX].
31. See ABA Comm. on Corp. Laws, supra n. 21, at 34. It is further stated here,
that "[w]hile a constantly carping boardroom critic will often be less effective in
working with the other directors and in counseling management, an attitude of
constructive skepticism and informed inquiry is not only appropriate but important in
furthering the board's competence as the monitor of management." Id.
32. See R. William Ide, Post-Enron CorporateGovernance Opportunities:Creating
a Culture of GreaterBoard Collaborationand Oversight, 54 Mercer L. Rev. 829, 837,
837 n. 35 (citing Jim Collins, Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap...
and Others Don't, 216 (Harper Bus. 2001). A failure to utilize these critical selection
skills sets or a willingness to allow these personal relationships to override this need is
said to harm the company. Id. at 837 n. 5.
33. Koontz, supra n. 20, at 26.
34. See Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. Fin.
Econ. 431, 431 (1988). (Michael S. Weisbach in an empirical study found that firms
with outside-dominated boards are more likely to remove a CEO when the firm is
performing poorly than firms with inside-dominated boards.)
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stated that "directors who are free from [ ] undue influence of the CEO
and other top managers" are paramount to an effective monitoring
board. 35 Consequently, the issue in light of the new laws and
regulations is whether the days of the "CEO" club or the "imperial
CEO ' 36 are over, and the new wave or model is that of the independent
director.
3
C. THE INDEPENDENTBOARD OF DIRECTORS

7

"In the corporate governance debate, all arguments ultimately
converge on the role of the board of directors in general, and on the
role of outside directors in particular." 38 Indeed, since the Berle and
Means theory was formulated in 1932, a theory that analyzed the
separation of ownership from management (control),3 9 there has been a
Per the Berle and Means theory on separation of ownership and control, control
of the board of directors ultimately resides in management (if not the CEO), since
management is able to control the election process and ensure that managementsponsored directors are elected. See Larry E. Ribstein & Peter V. Letsou, Business
Associations 254 (4th ed., Anderson 2003). How? "With many small share[ ]holders
widely scattered throughout, . . . management could [easily] perpetuate itself by using
corporate funds to solicit from the firm's shareholders the power to vote their shares at
corporate elections." Anyone therefore wishing to unseat an incumbent would have to
indulge in the expensive and risky task of acquiring a controlling bloc of stocks or
soliciting proxies from thousands of scattered investors to vote his shares. Id.
35. Troy A. Paredes, Enron: The Board, Corporate Governance, and Some
Thoughts on the Role of Congress, in Enron: Corporate Fiascos and Their
Implications 495, 498-99 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., Found. Press
2004).
36. Id. at 500. Because of the very dominant role assumed by the CEO in corporate
America, people tend to refer to the position as the "imperial CEO."
37. The distinction between an outside or independent director and an inside
director may not be clear or obvious in some instances, but the inside directors are
usually those who are full-time employees of the company, and outside directors are
usually those who do not have a full-time employment or commitment to the company.
According to Victor Brudney, independence in the narrower sense "refers to the
relationship of the directors, as representatives of stockholders, to management." In
the broader sense, "independence contemplate[s] directors who are not merely
independent monitors of management on behalf of stockholders, but who have loyalties
to specific constituencies, such as labor, consumers, women, minorities, or the public
affected by ... consequences of corporate activit[ies]." Victor Brudney, supra n. 25, at
598-99.
38. Gilson & Kraakman, supra n. 8, at 873.
39. Adolph Berle & Gardiner Means identified the importance of the rise of large
business enterprise (public corporations) and its implications on ownership and control.
(The "Berle and Means theory" is said to have been influential in the adoption of the
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search "for the corporate equivalent of the Holy Grail: a mechanism to
bridge the separation by holding managers accountable for their
performance.
In this pursuit, the predominant answer to the
accountability problem of the board has been unanimous-that
independent outside directors elected by shareholders should monitor
management. 4 1 The commonly accepted justification is that such
directors are not extricably woven into the company; as they usually
would not have any personal financial stake in retaining management,
they can therefore act as shareholder surrogates to assure
the company
42
is run in the best interests of its owners in the long term.
Hence, the trend under certain provisions of SOX and the NYSE
Listing Standards requires more independent members to sit on the
boards of directors than have done so in the past. The question remains
43
whether such independent boards enhance corporate management,
federal securities laws adopted shortly after the publication of the book they coauthored
in 1932, The Modern Corporationand PrivateProperty (Macmillan 1932). Ribstein &
Letsou, supra n. 34, at 254. They postulated that with an increase in corporate size
came greater dispersion of stock ownership, which resulted in reduced power and
interest in the corporation by the shareholders, and therefore an entrenchment of
managerial authority that is tantamount to a separation of ownership from control. Id.
In other words, the shareholders in a public corporation have little incentive or ability
to fend for themselves, compounded by the free rider problem which prevent
shareholders from effectively monitoring management.
On a relative scale, this theory is less accurate today than it was in 1932. First
of all, the increased specialization of today's economy suggests greater possibility of
insiders' possessing peculiar talent assets that produce firm specific value for the
corporation. Another rebuttal is that competition between firms for investment dollars
leads firms to adopt market and organizational devices that constraint managers to act
with shareholder interest-that is, private contracting is predominant rather than
regulation in dealing with agency costs and free rider problems. Also, many
corporations have shareholders who own substantial amounts of the firm's stock and
because they invariably will capture much gain from effecting corporate changes, they
are more actively involved in monitoring the firm's activities.
40. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra n. 8, at 873.
41. Id.
42. Id. However, these outside directors nonetheless "have substantial professional
or personal ties to the corporation or its CEO" and consequently, "[t]hese ties may
interfere with a director's ability to monitor [more] aggressively due to fears of
retaliation by the CEO." Fisch, supra n. 25, at 270; see infra nn. 70-84 and
accompanying text (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of independent
boards).
43. In a recent study by Bhagat and Black, where they conducted a large survey of
board composition and firm performance over a ten-year period, they found " 'no
convincing empirical support for the conventional wisdom that large company boards
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and thus impede a recurrence of the kind of corporate governance
failure as depicted by Enron and its progeny, or are they just window
dressing to appease the disappointed and faithless public in the market?
II. SOX, THE NYSE RULES, AND THE INDEPENDENT BOARD OF
DIRECTORS

Even before the famous recent corporate scandals, initiatives have
existed to reform corporate boards. In 1982, the American Law
Insitute drafted the " 'Principles of Corporate Governance:
Restatement and Recommendations,' 4 which was controversial in
almost all respects. The most controversial issue concerned the role of
The
independent board members in corporate governance. 4 5
unforeseen and shocking demise of companies such as Enron, Adelphia
Communications, WorldCom, Quest, and a few others, propelled
Congress to approve the Securities Exchange Commission's (SEC)
recommendation to pass SOX as a means to boost investors'
confidence. 4 6 One of the major innovations of the Act was the creation
of a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (Oversight Board),
which oversees audits of public companies that are subject to the
securities laws. 4 7 The principle purpose of the Oversight Board is to
should consist predominantly of independent directors.' " Indeed another study
actually identified a negative correlation "between corporate performance and greater
outside representation on the board." Fisch, supra n. 25, at 276-78 (footnotes omitted).
44. Bainbridge, supra n. 15, at 377 (citing Principles of Corporate Governance:
Restatement andRecommendations (ALl tent. draft no. 1, 1982).
45. Id. at 378.
46. The Act has been said to be unprecedented, because "in addition to regulating
disclosure and securities trading, the traditional jurisdiction of U.S Federal Securities
laws, the Act also addresses matters of substantive corporate governance and executive
fiduciary responsibility." These duties have historically been viewed as a prerogative
of the states and self-regulatory organizations (SROs). Michael Hein et al., The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Effects Sweeping Changes to the U.S. Federal Securities
at
(available
2002)
(Aug.
1,
1
Alert
GT
Laws,
http://www.gtlaw.compub/alerts/2002/heinm_08.pdf (accessed Mar. 18, 2006)).
"Simply by doing something, Congress and the NYSE showed that there was a
cop on the [block] and that fraud and corporate corruption would not be tolerated."
Paredes, supra n. 35, at 519. Others have said that the SOX and the SEC regulations do
provide new structure but were simply a political reaction to give assurance to the
public that the problems had been fixed. Hence, the primary focus was on what was
required to comply with the law and nothing more. Ide, supra n. 32, at 832.
47. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Corporations and Other Business Organizations:
Statutes, Rules, Materials,and Forms 2038 (Found. Press 2005).
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protect the interests of investors and [to engage] public interest in the
preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit reports...
48
Section 301 of SOX requires that NYSE and NASDAQ listed
companies have independent audit committees comprised solely of
independent directors. According to the Act, to be an independent
director, he or she may not receive any fees from the company, other
than a director or committee fee, or otherwise
be an affiliated person of
49
the company or any of its subsidiaries.
This section further requires that at least one of the independent
audit committee board members be a financial expert, or the company°
must explain in its SEC filling why it has no financial expert.v
Amazingly, compliance with the financial expert requirement seems to
be proving far better than anticipated. In a recent survey of the 100
largest public companies in the country, forty-two companies
voluntarily chose to publicly disclose the name of more than one audit
committee financial expert, and of those forty-two companies,
seventeen disclosed that all of the audit committee members are
financial experts. 5 1 This would appear to mean that good faith efforts
48. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2000).
49. SOX, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 776 (2002). Section 301 has
been said to add content to the director's duty to become informed since the:
board of directors is required, through its audit committee, to appoint and
oversee the work of the accounting firm employed by the corporation. Also,
in connection with its oversight function, the audit committee is responsible
for resolving disagreements between management and the auditor regarding
financial reporting. This responsibility for resolving disputes ensures that the
directors, who serve on the audit committee, take an active role in the
auditing process. [Consequently,] their knowledge about the process and the
company is enhanced, which heightens the content requirement of the duty to
be informed.
The Boards' responsibility to oversee public accounting firms also suggests
that directors have an affirmative duty to keep abreast of financial
information. Likewise, under section 302 of the Act, which generally deals
with Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports, section 302 (a)(4), (A)
and (B) require executive officers to establish and maintain internal controls
to ensure that material information is made known to officers. This means
that a laissez-fair[e] attitude towards corporate affairs is no longer tolerated;
[especially since] the CEO and CFO must certify the effectiveness of the
internal control procedures.
Shu-Acquaye, supra n. 6, at 40.
50. SOX, § 407, 116 Stat. 790.
51. Abigail Arms, CorporateGovernance Practices of the 100 Largest U.S. Public
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are being made-not only to comply with the Act, but also to disclose
information.
Several other provisions of SOX pertain directly to corporate
governance, with particular reference to the board and senior
executives. Section 305 grants the SEC authority to dismiss directors
and officers from their companies and can bar them from serving in
such capacity in other public companies; 52 section 402, which in the
past has been discretionarily used by corporate directors and officers in
public corporations, 53 bars public companies from directly or indirectly
making any loans to directors or officers; 54 section 406 requires that a
public company disclose under the SEC rules if a code of ethics has
been adopted for senior financial officers or an explanation of its
failure to adopt such a code; 55 and section 906 provides for stiff
criminal sanctions for CEOs who fail to comply with certain financial
certification requirements in addition to those under section 302.56
This Act was recently tested in the federal case against Richard
Companies, in Corporate Governance 2005: Dealing with the Governance &
15
(2004)
(available
at
Disclosure
Challenges
Ahead
www.pli.edu/emktg/compliance-coun/Corp-_GovIOa.pdf (accessed Jan. 25, 2006)).
52. SOX, § 305, 116 Stat. 778-79.
53. For example, in the case of Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 809 (1984), the
Meyers board of directors approved and made interest free loans to a board member
(Leo Fink), totaling $225,000, a thing which would be unlikely to happen today under
SOX.
54. Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 402, 116 Stat. 745, (2002).
This section is subject to certain limitations. It does not apply to:
" loans in existence before enactment of the Act that have not been modified after
its enactment;
" loans made for home improvement;
" manufactured home loans, as defined by the Home Owners' Loan Act, 12
U.S.C. 1464 § 5;
" extension of credit under an open end credit plan or through charge cards, as per
the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1602, 1637(c)(4)(e);
* loans by brokers to their employees, as regulated by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System; or loans made or maintained by an insured
depository institution, as defined by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12
U.S.C. 1813 § 3.
SOX, § 402.
55. SOX, § 406. For more on the code of ethics as a whole, see Model R. Prof.
Conduct (ABA 2002).
56. SOX, § 906(c). Section 906 imposes a $1 million fine, 10 years in prison, or
both for persons who knowingly violate the certification requirement and a 5 million
fine, 20 years in prison or both for willful violation of provision. Id.
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Scrushy. Scrushy was acquitted of all eighty-five counts with which he
was charged, including one of knowingly certifying false financial
statements in violation of section 906 of the Act. While some
commentators view this as a blow to the federal government's attempt
to hold corporations responsible for corrupt practices, they generally do
not find fault in the Act itself. 57 Even though the charge did not stand
in Scrushy's case, the legislation does "have teeth,",5 8 and the verdict
does not necessarily speak against the strength of the Act,59 which
remains good law.
Those who support the Act generally agree that
Scrushy was not found guilty under section 906 because the case itself
was too complex for the jurors to distinguish the circumstances
surrounding the SOX charge from the other charges, 6 1 or because
conviction under section 906 requires finding of guilt for other counts
of fraud.62
In the same vein, the NYSE has substantively regulated corporate
governance through its listing standards. After Enron and the other
corporate scandals, the NYSE proposed extensive amendments to its
listing standards that would effectively augment its regulatory authority
over corporate boards of directors. 63 The proposed amendments would
57. See Greg Morcroft, Scrushy Verdict Not Seen Hindering Sarbanes-Oxley,
(available
at
MarketWatch,
(June
28,
2005)
(accessed
http://www.investors.com/breakingnews.asp?journalid=2864621 l&brk=l
Mar. 18, 2006)); Thomas S. Mulligan, Ex-CEO Cleared in $2.7-Billion Fraud,L.A.
Times Al (June 29, 2005); Phyllis Plitch, Making Sarbanes Charge Stick Proves
Harder Than Expected, N.Y.
Sun, (June 29, 2005) (available at
http://www.nysun.com/article/16260 (accessed Mar. 18, 2006);; Andrew Ward,
Scrushy is Cleared ofAll Charges by U.S. Jury, Fin. Times London edition, 1 (June 29,
2005).
58. Interview by John Dimsdale with University of Southern California Law
Professor Eric Talley, MarketPlace (June 28, 2005) (Scrushy verdict draws reaction
from Sarbanes-Oxley supporters) (radio broadcast transcript).
59. Simon Romero & Kyle Whitmire, Former Chief of HealthSouth Acquitted in
$2.7 Billion Fraud,N.Y. Times Al, C4 (June 29, 2005).
60. See Mulligan, supra n. 57, at A21.
61. Id.; see also Morecroft, supra n. 57; Plitch, supra n. 57.
62. See Jonathan D. Glater, New Rules Make it Easier to Charge Executives, but
Not to Send Them to Prison,N.Y. Times C5 (July 2, 2005). The jury could not find
Scrushy guilty under charges of fraud, so they could not find him guilty under section
906.
63. See Paredes, supra n. 35, at 501, n. 26 ("Corporate Governance Rule Proposals
Reflecting Recommendations from the NYSE Corporate Accountability and Listing
Standards Committee [as] Approved by the NYSE Board of Directors, August 1, 2002
(No. SR -NYSE-2002-33 filed Aug. 16, 2002)").
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require that the board of directors of companies listed on the NYSE be
primarily comprised of "independent directors." A more stringent
definition of what constitutes an independent director was proposed.
In order for a director to be "independent," the director cannot
have a "material relationship" with the company, which includes
commercial, industrial, banking, consulting, legal, accounting,
charitable, or familial relationships. Additional restrictions
are also
64
imposed upon directors who seek status as an independent.
Although some scholars have expressed dissatisfaction with this
independent board requirement, the survey of the top 100 largest
United States public companies also demonstrated a general
development in trend towards exceeding the independent board

In late May and early June of 2002, NASDAQ and NYSE "both announced they
would be making recommendations to their respective boards of directors [to adopt]
additional corporate governance listing standards." NASDAQ's rules were primarily
limited to addressing shareholder approval of stock option plans, a restrictive definition
of independence, and audit committee approval of related party transactions. The
NYSE, on the other hand, took a more definitive first step of publishing its
Recommendations of its Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards on June 6,
2002. See Ide, supra n. 32, at 845-46.
Following the signing of SOX into law by the President, on July 30, 2002,
NASDAQ & NYSE took additional steps to ensure that their proposed listing standards
did not conflict with the provisions of the Act. In NASDAQ's case, the standards were
expanded to include additional and more comprehensive proposals that were more in
line with NYSE proposals. See Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of Corporate
Boards of Directors,40 San Diego L. Rev. 781, 790-91 (2003).
64. (1) Receives, or has an immediate family member who receives, more than
$100,000 per year in compensation from the company, other than director and
committee fees and pension or other forms of deferred compensation; (2) Is affiliated
with or employed by, or has an immediate family member who is affiliated with or
employed in a professional capacity by, a present or former internal or external auditor
of the company; (3) Is employed, or has an immediate family member who is
employed, as an executive officer of another company where any of the listed
company's present executives serves on the other company's compensation committee;
or (4) Is an executive officer or an employee, or has an immediate family member who
is an executive officer, of another company (a) that accounts for at least two percent or
$1 million, whichever is greater, of the listed company's consolidated gross revenues
or (b) for which the listed company accounts for a least two percent or $1 million,
whichever is greater, of the other company's consolidated gross revenues. In no event
will a current employee of the company be considered independent. See id. at 820, n.
21.
The implementation of disclosure controls and procedures requiring and ensuring that
information is recorded, processed, summarized and reported is an integral part of the
SEC's new rules implementing section 302 of the Act. See Ide, supra n. 32, at 849.
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requirement of SOX and the listing standards, either in policy or
practice. Hence, forty-six of the one hundred companies adopted the
more stringent standards of the NYSE and NASDAQ requiring that the5
6
board be comprised of at least a majority of independent directors.
Independent directors comprised seventy-five percent or more of the
boards for eighty-one of the top 100 companies. This tends to shows
that compliance with the requirement for an independent board of
directors is not necessarily as much of a nightmare as it may have been
portrayed.6 6
The greater question, however, is whether an effective
management is achieved through more board independence than would
be otherwise. 6 7 One of the ways to make such a determination is to
look at some of the advantages and disadvantages of the independent
board of directors. Because of the broad requirement that boards be
independent, a "one size fits all" rule tends to ignore not only the
varying idiosyncratic needs of companies but also that corporations are
inherently different. That is why efforts to create or construct an ideal
board are considered unwarranted, since companies can have very
different needs from their boards of directors, and "a universal model
board may be incapable of meeting those needs. ' 6 8 For example, firmspecific characteristics may cause some companies to require more
extensive monitoring from their board, while in others, alternative
monitoring mechanisms such as ownership structure may substitute for
board monitoring. Likewise, creditors may substitute for monitoring

65. See Arms,supra n. 51, at 15.
66. See Lisa Holton, HELP WANTED: Filling Vacancies on Corporate Boards

Creates Headaches for In-House Lawyers, 90 ABA J. 30 (Mar. 2004). In-house
counsel complained of the uphill tasks and challenges they faced in finding
independent directors to serve on boards as a result of the enactment of SOX requiring
independent directors. "When it comes to finding those additional independent board
members, lawyers say they can no longer rely on their company's reputation alone to
attract top talent." "Most director candidates want to read [board meeting] minutes
from years earlier and receive detailed briefings about all litigation before they'll
consider the job." This background work only snowballs because other issues such as
indemnification and how to preserve the confidentiality arise. Likewise, because more
time commitment would be expected from these officers, the law invariably impacts on

the number of multiple - outside boards that can be held by CEOs and top-level
executives, thereby narrowing the pool of experienced directors. Id.
67. For a detailed discussion of the impact of the Act on the duty of directors, see
generally Shu-Acquaye, supra n. 6, at 45.
68. Fisch, supra n. 25, at 284.
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for equity holders, while institutional investors or banks may monitor
management directly.
Along the same line, the nature of a corporation's business may
impact its need for board monitoring, hence the balance between inside
and outside directors. For example, "[a] firm with large free cash
reserves.. . or one [for] which direct market oversight of management
decisionmaking is difficult, needs an enhanced internal monitoring
structure," whereas a corporation in a regulated industry may require
less monitoring because of the transactional controls required by
69
regulation.
III. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF AN INDEPENDENT BOARD
A commonly-noted advantage to having an inside or independent
director is that they can give adequate time and attention to the duty as
a director, and are therefore generally more familiar with the
business. 70 This familiarity, which translates to greater knowledge of a
company's operation and involvement in action taken, is tied to his or
her personal incentive to see the company succeed, and may resultantly
translate to the director making "intelligent and more highly-motivated
company policy decisions., 71 This leaves one wondering, though, why
the full-time directors of the recently failed companies mentioned
above did not resurrect the company with information they were
supposed to have known, or which adequate monitoring would have
revealed. Take Enron for example, where the top officers and board
members claimed they did not know what was taking place. Yet, it is
not common for public corporations to simply authorize their CFO to
run an independent entity that enters into billions of dollars of risky and
volatile transactions with them, nor allows "senior officers to profit
from such self-dealing transactions without broad supervision or even
comprehension of the profits involved. ' ' 7 2 What happened to the board
69. Id. at 284-85.
70. Id. at 285-86. The counter-argument is that the independent or outside director
cannot be expected to have the kind of intimate inside information of the company's
operations as the insider.
71. Koontz, supra n. 20, at 126. In the same vein, an insider, whose career and
compensation depend on corporate performance, has a greater stake in the firm's
success than an outsider, who receives X amount of dollars per year regardless of how
the company performs. See Fisch, supra n. 25, at 275.
72. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers,
Stupid, " in Enron: CorporateFiascos and Their Implications 125, 125-26 (Nancy B.

WHITTIER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 27

then, especially given that only two of the fourteen Enron board
members were insiders? 7 3 Why were they so passive? 74 Is the answer
to efficient corporate governance really found in independent members
of the board of directors?
Can one be independent by qualifications, yet mentally
dependent? "[P]sychological studies on group behavior indicate that
members of a group operate under social pressures that encourage
conformity to the group, or a lack of objectivity. Therefore, being
'independent' in the true sense of the word, makes it trite to say that the
socialization process of board [group] members, as well as the
influence generally exerted by the CEO over the board, denies directors
true independence." 75
This compromise of independence is
corroborated by a recent study of board norms in corporate boards,
which evidences substantial conformity pressures that demonstrate a
lack of directorial independence: board members are not to criticize
the CEO, especially in front of inside directors; boards are not to "seek
information outside the communication channels provided by the
CEO"; and "board members should not discuss issues of accountability
or the premises on which the board operates. ' 7 6 This being the case, it

Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., Found. Press 2004). Enron CFO Andrew Fastow, for
example, was on both sides of a number of financial deals, serving as the general
partner of special purposes entities (such as LJM) where he stood to make millions by
essentially negotiating against Enron-talk about biting the finger that feeds you!
Paredes, supra n. 35, at 503.
73. Id. at 504. Kenneth Lay and Jeffery Skilling were the two insiders. Id. These
directors came from a variety of backgrounds: finance business accounting and
government experience. For a list of the board members, see Enron Proxy Statement
(2001)
(available
at
http:/Ibodurtha.georgetown.edu/enron/.%5CProxy2001_march_27.htm (accessed Mar. 18, 2006)). Likewise the board had all the
important and vital committees such as the executive, audit, compliance, compensation,
nominating and corporate governance committee. Id.
74. Coffee explains that Enron's failure is more about gatekeeper failure than the
board. Indeed, the Enron board was present but passive and as a result, they failed to
safeguard their shareholders interest by allowing the company to engage in high risk
accounting, inappropriate conflict of interest transactions, extensive undisclosed offthe-books activities and excessive executive compensation. The board closed it eyes to
these transactions over the years, and eventually leading to the ultimate demise of the
company. How can one say, the board was really not a leading cause of the demise of
the company? See generally Coffee, supra n. 72, at 125-42.
75. See Shu-Acquaye, supra n. 6, at 48 (citing Dallas, supra n. 63, at 804.
76. See Lynne L. Dallas, Proposalsfor Reform of Corporate Boards of Directors:
The Dual Board and Board Ombudsperson, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 91, 111 (1997)
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would appear that more should be considered than simply being an
outsider when choosing independent board members, especially given
that research also tends to show that group and task characteristics tend
to decrease group member independence.
Likewise, attraction among members characterize corporate
boards-"members are primarily motivated to serve on boards because
of the identity of other board members, rather than the financial
condition of the corporation" or belief of their potential contribution in
the corporation. In other words, the attractiveness of other board
members is most important when board members accept board
positions. 7 8 Besides economic ties that can compromise directors'
independence, social and personal ties are also contributing factors.
This is especially true given that directors are often appointed on a
"man know man" basis; that is, they have a tie to incumbent directors,
senior officers, or the CEO, and, because they serve closely together,
they tend to be less critical of one another and senior management.
Further, an outside director who is an executive at another company
may be inclined to identify with, or defer
to, management the same
79
way she hopes her board will defer to her.
Although much is said supporting the rationale for independent
boards, it has its shortcomings. The problem with having independent
board members is that it may be hard to obtain adequate talent to fit the
post sought; the cost that would have to be paid is therefore much
higher. This is especially true since the enactment of the Act and the
implementation of new NYSE rules. Serving on the board of directors,
particularly on the audit committee or other committees, becomes a
difficult and time consuming job, in which the director must maintain
an active role of being accountable. Consequently, creating a culture
(citing Jay W. Lorsch & Elizabeth Maclver, Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of
Americas CorporateBoards 91-96, 170-71 (1989)).
77. Id. at 108-09. According to the process of normative influence, compliance is
expected when a group member depends on other group members to receive valuable
rewards and to avoid costs. Consequently, a member is more likely to conform to the
group when group controls valuable consequences. Corporate boards are characterized
by their ability to provide valuable benefits to members, such as the prestige that comes
from being chosen as a board member, business experience acquired from board
memberships and financial compensation.
78. Id. If a broad spectrum of publicly traded corporations exhibits this trend, then
the "independent board" requirement is truly an illusion.
79. Paredes, supra n. 35, at 511. Alternatively, she might just believe that the CEO
knows what is best for the company and therefore be accorded that discretion. Id.

WHITTIER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 27

of accountability requires an extensive overhaul of the corporate
governance structure of the board and senior management, and will
80
result in additional costs to corporations to implement these changes.
The proposed rules would tend to limit insider director involvement,
and may promote an adversarial, disconnected relationship between the
board of directors and senior corporate management. 8 1 Furthermore,
the NYSE definition of "independent director" seems to have made it
virtually impossible to find the right person, one who does not have
some affiliation with the company that would disqualify him or her.
As a result, the limited pool of choices does not make the position
competitive enough.
Hence, the best-qualified persons may be
qualified in form rather than in substance; a compromise for which the
board may, at some point, have to pay.
Arguments have been made that outside directors are to be
utilized as specialists in limited fields; the more specialists on a board,
the greater the benefits to result from the collaboration of knowledge.
However, by relying too strongly on large numbers of outside directors
or specialists, boards may find a weakening in public confidence
in
82
inside.
the
from
company
the
manage
effectively
to
ability
their
In order to keep himself occupied, the inside director may involve
himself too much with operational details that may tend to undermine
83
the responsibilities of top-level functional or divisional managers.
Likewise, this compounds the effect of looking at things primarily from
the inside perspective without a counter or fresh look from the outside.
The inside director's perspective may be blurred to what other outside
business perspectives may bring; whereas, an outsider, "not being
embroiled in company operations and hopefully being more widely
exposed to the outside world . .. can bring to the board a kind of
freshness that [insiders cannot provide]." '
Can the "majority
independent board of director requirement" undoubtedly reduce
corporate governance problems, or is even more required from such an
independent board to truly be effective?

80. See Ide, supra n. 32, at 871 (putting in place for example, corporate governance
guidelines, codes of ethics, committee charters, etc.).
81. See Bainbridge, supra n. 15, at 393.
82. Id. at 382, 384.
83. Koontz, supra n. 20, at 132.
84. Id. at 129. The corporation would thereby have an "advantage of a broader and
more diversified experience, more accurately attuned to society." Id. at 128.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE (INDEPENDENT)
BOARD
As mentioned earlier, one of the criticisms of the Act is that it
applies to all companies, regardless of the idiosyncratic needs or
preference of a particular business type. Consequently, a proposal to
the mandatory adoption of an independent board as required under SOX
and the NYSE rules is that rule makers should have adopted a set of
default rules with opt-out possibility rather than the mandatory rules
currently implemented; 85 that is, regulators and policy makers would
have proposed a list of "best practices" for corporate governance.
Under such rules, companies would be required to comply with the
rules, or explain in their SEC filings why they have chosen not to do
so. Such opportunity would be preferable, even if requiring a
supermajority vote of shareholders to opt out.86 This approach would
provide investors with useful information about a company's
governance system, and investors could consequently respond
accordingly through their trading and voting rights.
How relevant is this to governance? Reforms that empower
investors to hold directors and officers more accountable, as opposed to
regulating the board directly, would tend to improve corporate
accountability.8 7 As Vice Chancellor Strine of the Delaware Chancery
Court aptly puts it:
[Q]uite bluntly, it is questionable whether costly government
policies ought be directed at placing crutches under well heeled
investors who can walk for themselves. The most vigorous
enforcement of director fiduciary duties cannot hope to substitute
for careful monitoring performed by rational and active investors.
88

Thus, even a more independent board may not be effective if the
directors are not accountable for their failures. In short, strengthening
accountability through investors may lead to effective board
governance.
85. Paredes, supra n. 35, at 536.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the
Corporation Law Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 Bus. Law. 1371, 1402
(2002)).
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Others propose that a separation of the position of the CEO and
chairman of the board may "direct greater control over board agenda[s]
and deliberations into the hands of outsiders." 89 Whether this
perception translates to a reality is another issue to observe, but to
some "[t]he key to meaningful reform of corporate governance is the
replacement of the CEO-centric mindset, [within] which the board and
senior managers are caught in an atmosphere of guarded
' 90
acquiescence. "
A proposal by Professors Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman,
electing a board of professional directors 9 1 to enhance corporate
governance is really not far removed from discussing the independent
92
board of directors as proposed under SOX and NYSE rules.
According to them, most boards would be divided into three groups:
inside management directors, traditional outside directors, and
professional directors. Why another layer of professional directors?
They suggest that an additional layer of professional directors should
be considered because these professional directors will have more
skills, time, and motivation to monitor on behalf of institutional
investors. 93 The group of professional directors (which should make
up twenty-five percent of the board) "would be large enough to make
its voice heard clearly but small enough to leave control in the hands of
management's nominees." According to these authors, their influence
on the board would be felt, for example, where an issue divides the
professional board and management: The balance of power will rest
with the traditional outsider directors. As such, "the traditional
outsiders would assume a quasi-adjudicative function"-a role that
they are more likely to perform capably than the monitoring role. In
the same vein, if the "professional directors accept the onus of posing
hard questions and framing strategic alternatives, traditional outside
directors could be drawn into real discussions of company policy" and

89. Fisch, supra n. 25, at 271.
90. Ide, supra n. 32, at 834.
91. See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra n. 8. These professional directors
would come from an organized clearinghouse. Id. at 886-87 (discussing how such a
clearinghouse may be created).
92. Id. at 888-91 (though mentioned in light of institutional investors, their proposal
applies in this context).
93. Id. at 888-89. Unlike the traditional outside director, the position of the
professional director envisions a full-time commitment. Id. at 885.
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may be in9 4 a better position to reject management views where
warranted.
Having this extra layer, however, does not only involve additional
costs to the shareholders, but also simply induces the outside directors
to do what they really should be doing in the first place. Because
outsiders cannot ask the hard questions, another group should be hired
to do it; this basically seems to be a way of emboldening the traditional
directors to act. 95 Besides, one would wonder how these three layers
would interact at such a board meeting in a way to make their best
contribution in a group setting, given that all may want to be heard and
the meeting may drag on and on.
In my opinion, this could be just another bureaucratic layer that
only multiplies the same function, time, and costs; that is why an
effective chairperson should be not only familiar with the subject
matter of the meeting, but also with the personalities of the board
members. 96 This may mean encouraging the shy and suppressing the
too verbose; asking the most informed to lead off a discussion, or
calling upon a director who has some constructive and useful ideas on a
subject. 97 As eloquently put, the chairperson, or whoever is presiding
98
over the board of directors, must be something of a "bird watcher."
94. Id. at 889. Information asymmetry is not apparently an issue to the professional
director because these professional directors with a mandate to challenge unsatisfactory
performance would oblige management to produce information in order to defend its
policies. Hence, management's only credible response to the hard questions asked or
alternative strategies by the professional directors would be to share more information,
not less. Id. at 890.
95. Id. at 892. The authors however admit that the professional director structure
may fail to improve corporate governance in some companies, where they may, for
example, "be outvoted and isolated by management's nominees"; management may
"successfully disguise problems [or] close off alternative strategies before the
professional directors could act." Id.
96. Koontz, supra n. 20, at 192.

97. Id. at 193.
98. Professor M.L. Mace has analogized familiar personalities of board members to
those of fictitious birds. His" 'board birds' "include:

1. The Loud-mouthed Black Crow-who uses the board as a forum
to crow over his accomplishments.
2. The Yellowbellied Responsibility-avoider-who finds in the
board the perfect place to exercise authority fearlessly without the
danger of being held personally responsible for his actions.
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Another board proposal for an effective board of directors (with
which I tend to agree) provides that a board ombudsman, whose
qualifications creates or permits its independence from management,
be appointed to a full-time position. 99 However, unlike the corporate
ombudsperson, 10 0 who operates outside the corporation's formal

3. The Pollyannish Song Sparrow-who sings his happy song of
good fellowship and unanimous agreement to spread togetherness
and avoid free discussion.
4. The White-breasted Nuthatcher-who hatches nutty ideas, not
related to the subject, which take hours of time to dispose of.
5. The Red-tailed Bandwagon-Jumper-who stays on the fence
until he sees how a decision is going and then hops merrily on the
bandwagon.
6. The Black-breasted Screech Owl-who shrieks dire warnings of
disaster for any course of action the board considers.
7. The Gimlet-eyed Nitpicker-who insists upon having every
statement and statistic presented to the board carefully reviewed
and rechecked.
8. The After-luncheon Napper-who finds the board a comfortable
place to dream while others deliberate and reach conclusions.
9. The Long-winded Coot-who takes 15 minutes of board time to
ask the question to which he gets the perfect answer by providing
it himself.
10. The Logger-headed Sandbagger-who takes exception to and
sandbags every constructive idea brought before the board.
11. The Duck-billed Doubletalker-who confuses everyone and
straddles every issue by talking out of both sides of his mouth.
Id. at 193-94.
99. See generally Dallas, supra n. 76.
100. The corporate ombudsman serves as an impartial judge and deals primarily with
"various personnel policies, such as performance evaluations, terminations, work
assignments and transfers [as well as) various forms of harassment within the
workplace." Id. at 131 n. 155, 132 (citing Bureau of Natl. Affairs, Inc., Ombuds Jobs
Are Proliferating and Characterizedby Diversity, 2 Prac. & Perspective 198, 198-99
(1988)).
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hierarchy, deals mostly with management/employee relations
problems,' 0 ' and is usually appointed by the CEO, 10 2 the proposed
board ombudsperson is appointed by independent directors (not by
management) to serve mainly as an information conduit for
independent directors on the board. The board ombudsperson would
consequently have access to all the employees of the corporation as
well as its books and records, and, in conjunction, should attend all
board meetings. Hence, the information asymmetry problem (that is
often advanced as a weakness of independent board members) is
apparently taken care of by the board ombudsperson bridging this
information gap between inside and outside directors, and the board
ombudsperson's allegiance to or control by management is reduced;
103
these are the paramount reasons why I tend to favor this proposal.
As a result, the ombudsperson's responsibilities are not
determined by the senior executives, but by the independent members
of the board of directors, and, the effectiveness of the board
ombudsperson is very much dependent on her independence from
management; a link currently problematic in severing between the
traditional independent board of directors and other board members or
senior management. In so doing, the board ombudsperson may provide
101. Id. at 131. In attempting to resolve these problems, the corporate ombudsperson
would fact find, problem solve, counsel, negotiate, mediate and communicate
information. Id. at 132 n.159 (citing The Ombudsman Assn, Ombudsman Handbook 15 (1994)). His functions are also carried out informally rather than publicly, with an
ultimate benefit for the corporation which includes productivity improvements, saving
of valuable management time by diffusing potentially disruptive personnel problems,
litigation cost savings in deflecting possible labor law suits, feedback to senior
management resulting in beneficial changes in corporate policies and procedures, and
so on. Id. at 132-33.
102. Id. at 131, 134. As would be expected therefore, the support of management
would be essential for an effective ombudsperson. "Most corporate ombudspersons are
long-time employees of the corporation," and are picked for their detailed knowledge
about how things work in the corporation and their skills. Id. at 134.
103. Even though this is yet another multiplication of function, I however believe, in
this case, it is more effective in creating independence for the independent director,
given the power and value of information, which may no longer be asymmetry. Of
course, other factors would contribute to this independence from management- the
ombudsperson would have "no significant relationship with the corporation for at least
three years prior to and after [his] tenure as ombudsperson." There would also be
stringent eligibility requirements for the position to avoid any conflict of interests.
Thus, board ombudspersons may include retired judges, accountants, lawyers,
academicians, former executive officers of other corporations and public officials. Id.
at 135 (footnote omitted).
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tremendous benefit to the corporation, such as offering an independent
10 4
informed perspective of senior executives officers, and much more.
As mentioned earlier, directors' independence can also be
maximized through utilizing independent board committees, which
may "allow independent directors to make decisions free from the risk
of domination by insiders."' 1 5 The focus, though, should be on the
status or "form" a director takes rather than the "substance"; i.e.,
whether the director's decisions are free from any influence or motives
whatsoever. Therefore, one would tend to find, for example, that
shareholder derivative suits and executive compensation are placed
under the auspices of an independent committee, a thing that the courts
are also giving deference to in making some decisions. 106
V. CONCLUSION

There certainly exists a need for improved corporate governance
in the United States, especially as exhibited by the major corporate
failures of Enron and its progeny. Indeed, a new paradigm-whether
through SOX as a whole, or through the independent director
empowerment solution-is a welcomed change, especially if it results
in better corporate accountability and corporate productivity, which
improves shareholder value. Regardless, it still remains a decision for
each corporate director and officer to consider their office with a new
approach and the seriousness, commitment, dedication and good faith
that it requires. Even though SOX requires them to do so or otherwise
face consequences for failing to do so, the ultimate solution to
enhanced corporate governance should lie within each of these
individuals and not only on how many independent directors are in the
company. Even the aforementioned American Law Institute (ALI)
104. See generally id. at 133-134.
105. Fisch, supra n. 25, at 271.
106. Id. With regards to derivative suits, such suits could be dismissed at the request
of an independent litigation committee of the board, as exemplified by the early case of
Auerbach v. Bennett, where the court ruled that an interested board could delegate its
authority to a special litigation committee composed of disinterested directors whose
recommendation that the derivative litigation be dismissed would be entitled to the
business judgment rule presumption. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 623-24
(1979). Hence, under the Auerbach approach, "a court would inquire into the
committee member's disinterestedness, [ ] the reasonableness of the procedures used in
their deliberations, and [ their good faith. See O'Kelley & Thompson, supra n. 5, at
424.
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recommendations first created in 1982 have since been refined to only
for good corporate practices, instead of proposed
be recommendations
07
statutory changes.1
The issue is how independently minded each member is of the
board in carrying out their function; this is difficult to determine by any
person other than the one concerned. It is hard to determine a man's
mind at any time without a tour of his brain-a virtually impossible
task to perform. As Macbeth said, "[t]here's no Art to finde [sic] the
Mindes [sic] construction in the Face."' I° 8 However, even as reforms
are geared towards greater independence in boards of directors,
(undoubtedly relevant and important, as demonstrated here), this
cannot necessarily be the only solution to enhanced corporate
governance. As the tweaking to enhance corporate governance goes
on, only time will determine whether these reforms are meeting the
goals set out to be achieved. One thing is certain, however: SOX and
the independent board of directors' wave of reforms are here to stay.

107. See Bainbridge supra n. 15, at 395.
108. William Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act I, Scene IV (Jay L. Halio ed., Oliver &
Boyd 1972).

